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In this paper, we investigate the nexus between life insurance and suicide behavior using 
OECD cross-country data from 1980 to 2002. Through semiparametric instrumental 
variable regressions with fixed effects, we find that for the majority of observations, there 
exists a positive relationship between suicide rate and life insurance density (premium per 
capita). Since life insurance policies pay death benefits even in suicide cases after the 
suicide exemption period, the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard suggests an 
incentive effect that leads to this positive relationship. The novelty of our analysis lies in 
the use of cross-country variations in the length of the suicide exemption period in life 
insurance policies as the identifying instrument for life insurance density. Our results 
provide compelling evidence suggesting the existence of adverse selection and moral 
hazards in life insurance markets in OECD countries. 
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Suicide is one of the most serious and vexing issues faced in all modern societies. 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), approximately 3,000 people 
commit suicide every day, and every 30 seconds, one suicide-related death is reported. 
Moreover, in the last 45 years, suicide rate has increased by 60% worldwide (WHO, 
2007). Many medical professionals consider suicide to be the results of depression and 
other psychiatric disorders (Mann et al., 2005). However, as early as in 1897, sociologist 
Émile Durkheim, in his seminal book—Le Suicide—developed the concept of social 
integration to understand suicides.2 On the other hand, Hamermesh and Soss (1974), in 
their economic theory on suicide, employed an expected lifetime utility maximization 
framework to explain suicides as “rational” decisions. Nonetheless, existing literature has 
disregarded the role of economic or financial incentives in inducing suicide. 
Suicides induced by economic incentives are not rare in real life; even 
government policies can induce suicides through moral hazard. For example, in some 
states in India, there has been an increase in the suicide rate; this is probably due to the 
government policy of compensating bereaved families for the loss of a breadwinner who 
has killed himself (The Economist, June 21, 2007). This study focuses on life insurance-
induced adverse selection and moral hazard. Life insurance contracts also provide 
incentives to commit suicide as death benefits are paid in cases of suicides after the 
suicide exemption period.3  In fact, Toyokawa and Shiromizu (1998) and Amemiya 
(2002) stated that there was an increase in the number of suicides among life insurance 
policy holders immediately after the suicide exemption period. Moreover, according to 
                                                 
2 Satī is an old Hindu funeral practice in which the widow sacrifices her life by burning herself on her 
husband’s funeral pyre; satī has been cited by Durkheim as an example of altruistic suicides in cases 
when there is high social integration. Contemporary sociologists have employed the same concept to 
explain Kamikaze pilots and suicide bombers. Chen, Choi, and Sawada (2007b) also provide evidence 
that the co-guarantor borrowing system in Japan induces suicides of borrowers in cases where the 
magnitude of social stigma and the degree of altruism are high. 
3 A suicide exemption period (suicide provision; suicide clause) states that if the insured dies as a 
result of suicide within the period specified in the suicide clause, the death benefit would not be paid to   3
one media report, payments made by a major Japanese life insurance company increased 
by 50% from 1995 to 2005 due to suicides; further, in 2005, 10% of the company’s total 
insurance payments went to suicide-related deaths (Mainichi Shinbun, October 4, 2005). 
These examples imply that some suicides were induced by adverse selection and moral 
hazard under asymmetric information. 
According to asymmetric information models, in the presence of substantial 
adverse selection and moral hazard, life insurance participants would have a higher 
suicide rate compared to nonparticipants. However, there has been no economic 
research that directly explores this potential link between suicide and life insurance 
(Villeneuve, 2000). A closely related study by Tseng (2006) employed the mortality data 
submitted by large U.S. insurance companies to the Society of Actuaries (SOA); the 
results revealed that the suicide rate of the insured quadrupled after the expiry of the 
suicide exemption period. However, Tseng (2006) reveals contradictory data: the suicide 
rate of the general population was two to three times higher than that among the insured. 
In this paper, we aim to investigate the causal relationship between life insurance 
density and suicide rate based on the asymmetric information theory. The primary 
difficulty in establishing the relationship between suicide and life insurance is the 
endogeneity associated with the use of the life insurance variable to explain the suicide 
rate. Controlling observable socioeconomic factors, the demand for life insurance rises 
with an increase in unobservable factors such as risk type (tendency to commit suicide), 
degree of risk aversion, and degree of altruism. These unobservable factors may also 
affect suicide decisions, thereby causing the endogeneity problem due to omitted 
variables. The novelty of our analysis lies in the use of cross-country variations in the 
length of the suicide exemption period of life insurance policies as the identifying 
instrument for life insurance demand. 
                                                                                                                                            
any beneficiaries; after this period lapses, suicide is treated the same as death caused by other reasons.   4
In theory, due to adverse selection and given a distribution of risk type, a shorter 
exemption period should be systematically correlated with a higher proportion of riskier 
types among the insured.4 In reality, the length of the exemption period is the same 
within each Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
country, and it is determined either by insurance laws or industrial norms; the only 
exception is the United States, where the length of the suicide exemption period differs 
across states (see Table 1 for details). In fact, the exemption periods during our sample 
period of 1980–2002 are constant in most OECD countries, and therefore, can be 
considered as exogenous. Even in Belgium, Greece, and Japan, where the lengths of the 
suicide exemption period changed, these changes were made with significant lags, and 
therefore, can be considered as predetermined.5  Hence, cross-country variations in 
suicide exemption periods generate a situation of “quasi-natural experiments” where 
representative agents are faced with different incentive schemes for exogenous reasons 
(Chiappori, 2000). In summary, we use cross-country variations in the length of the 
suicide exemption periods as the identifying instrument for life insurance, in order to 
address the endogeneity problem in the suicide regression equation due to omitted 
variables. 
The results obtained through semiparametric instrumental variable (IV) 
regressions using the data of OECD countries from 1980 to 2002 reveal that there exists 
a positive causality between life insurance density and suicide rate. This main result 
                                                 
4 In the extreme case when life insurance policies deny death benefits in suicide cases—i.e., the length 
of the exemption period is infinite—individuals who are seriously contemplating suicide would not 
purchase such life insurance policies. 
5 In Belgium and Greece, in the case of death by suicide, death benefits were denied in life insurance 
policies until 1992 and 1996, respectively. The lengths of the suicide exemption periods were one year 
in Belgium since 1993 and two years in Greece since 1997. In Japan, the length of the exemption 
period was one year until 1999. The extension of the length of the suicide exemption period in 2000 
was a response to the sudden increase in the number of suicides in 1998. In that year, the total number 
of suicides in Japan increased by 34.7%, i.e., from 24,391 in 1997 to 32,863 in 1998. For readers’ 
information, the length of the suicide exemption period in Japan was further extended to three years in   5
provides compelling evidence of the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard in 
life insurance markets. The existence of asymmetric information in the life insurance 
market—which is the largest private insurance market—has rarely been examined 
empirically, and existing studies such as Beliveau (1984) and Cawley and Philipson (1999) 
provide mixed results. 6,7 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I presents an 
empirical model, and Section II describes the data used in this study. Section III presents 
the results of the empirical analysis, and Section IV provides some concluding remarks 
and implications for further study.  
 
I. Empirical Model 
 
There are at least two types of asymmetric information problems involved in the 
nexus between life insurance and suicides: moral hazard and adverse selection.8 With 
respect to the moral hazard problem, we can postulate a model of suicide as a function 
of the amount of life insurance purchased. If suicide and life insurance purchase are 
positively correlated, the finding will be consistent with the hypothesis of life insurance-
induced moral hazard. In order to analyze the model empirically, we employ the 
                                                                                                                                            
2005.  
6 In contrast, there has been a wide variety of empirical tests on the theoretical implications derived 
from asymmetric information models in non-life insurance markets, for example, the automobile 
insurance market in particular (Chiappori, 2000; Chiappori and Salanié, 2000). 
7 By using a data set from the Life Insurance Marketing Research Association (LIMRA), Beliveau 
(1984) found a positive relationship between life insurance premium rate and the amount of coverage 
purchased; this served as evidence in support of adverse selection. Nonetheless, this finding was 
challenged by Cawley and Philipson (1999). Using three data sets including LIMRA, they showed that 
unit prices did not rise with coverage, which is inconsistent with the theory of life insurance under 
asymmetric information. 
8 Here, the moral hazard is that some of the insured, who had no intention of committing suicide before 
purchasing the insurance, commit suicides. However, they would not have chosen to do so had they not 
been insured. Suicides are considered as ex post—costlessly verifiable events—and therefore exclude 
fake suicides by the insured or homicides staged as suicides by the beneficiaries.   6
following semiparametric regression model of suicide as a nonparametric function of life 
insurance density D:  
 
( 1 )      l o g   Sit = Xitθ + f (log Dit) + uit, 
 
where i and t represent the countries and years, respectively. The dependent variable log 
Sit is the natural log of the suicide rate; Xit is the set of attributes including socioeconomic 
variables such as real GDP per capita, growth rate of real GDP per capita, Gini 
coefficient, female labor participation rate, birth rate, divorce rate, and per capita alcohol 
consumption; and Dit refers to the life insurance density. The final term, uit, is an error 
term. 
The econometric concern of Equation (1) is that the life insurance variable is 
likely to be correlated with the error term uit due to unobserved factors simultaneously 
affecting both suicide and the demand for life insurance. Such factors may include the 
risk type, the degree of risk aversion, and the extent of altruism. Therefore, there can be 
correlation between the error term and insurance variable such that E(u|log D, X) ≠ 0. 
This will generate a bias in the estimation of the nonparametric function f(･) in Equation 
(1). In order to resolve this endogeneity problem, we impose two refinements on 
Equation (1). First, we decompose the error term in Equation (1) as follows: uit, = αi + βt 
+  δiT + εit,. This decomposition controls for unobserved country-specific and time-
specific fixed effects through the addition of αi and βt respectively. Further, the 
decomposition controls for unobserved country-specific but time-varying effects by 
allowing country-specific coefficient δi for the linear time trend T. In this way, we 
attempt to cope with the endogeneity bias arising from the omitted variables. 
Second, we introduce an IV regression equation for the life insurance density 
using the length of the exemption period variables as the instrument, in order to mitigate   7
the endogeneity bias arising from the simultaneity problem. In general, there can be two 
opposing effects of the correlation between the life insurance density and the length of 
the exemption period. On the one hand, a shorter exemption period may increase the life 
insurance demand by attracting riskier types; on the other, the increase in the proportion 
of the riskier types among the insured may increase the insurance premium, decrease the 
proportion of safe types, and hence decrease the life insurance demand. Therefore, the 
net effect is an empirical question. 
In terms of the econometric framework, we apply the augmented regression 
technique of Holly and Sargan (1982) to the IV regression equation for the life insurance 
density: 
 
( 2 )       l o g   Dit = Zit γ + ηit,  
 
where Z is the set of determinants of life insurance density; Z includes the length of the 
life insurance exemption period variables as identifying instruments as well as the lagged 
log life insurance density and the socioeconomic variables in Equation (1). Following 
Holly and Sargan (1982), Blundell et al. (1998), and Gong et al. (2005), we assume that 
E(η|Z, X) = 0 and E(ε|log D, Z, X, M) = ρη, where M includes country-specific and 
time-specific fixed effects and the country-specific linear time trend. The first conditional 
mean assumption implies that the length of the exemption period—the key identifying 
instrument—is uncorrelated with the error term η in Equation (2); error term η includes 
unobserved factors such as the risk type, the degree of risk aversion, and the extent of 
altruism. The second conditional mean assumption provides the structure of the way in 
which ε and η are related.9 
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The validity of the first conditional mean assumption can be justified as follows. 
First, the length of the exemption period is held constant during our sample period of 
1980–2002 in a majority of OECD countries, and hence can be considered to be 
exogenous.10 Second, even in Belgium, Greece, and Japan, where the lengths of the 
exemption periods changed, the changes were made with significant lags, and hence can 
be considered as predetermined. 
Finally, the semiparametric regression model of Equation (1) can be rewritten as 
follows: 
 
(3)    log  Sit = Xitθ + f (log Dit) + αi + βt + δiT + ρη + vit, 
 
where E(v|log D, Z, X, M) = 0. In Equation (3), if the estimated parametric part shows 
that f’(･) > 0, we can interpret the derivative as being consistent with the presence of 
moral hazard and adverse selection in the life insurance market. 
In order to estimate Equation (3), we use Lokshin’s (2006) algorithm, which is 





Our data set includes all OECD countries for the period of 1980–2002. The raw 
number of suicides and population according to gender and age groups were obtained 
                                                 
10 The length of the exemption period is the same within each OECD country, and it is determined 
either by insurance laws or industrial norms, except in the United States where the length of the suicide 
exemption period differs across states. 
11 In particular, first-order differencing was used to estimate Equation (3). It is assumed that f(·) is a 
smooth function that belongs to a particular parametric family with bounded first derivatives.   9
from the WHO Mortality Database. The suicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants for specific 
gender-age groups was calculated by the ratio of the number of suicides to the 
population of the specific gender-age group. Furthermore, with regard to the total male 
and female groups, the suicide rates were converted into age-standardized suicide rates 
per 100,000 inhabitants by using the world standard population figures published by 
WHO.12 By using this adjustment, the differences in the age structure across countries 
and time can be controlled by the age-standardized suicide rate. In other words, it is not 
necessary to include the share of specific age groups in the analysis (Neumayer, 2003). 
A considerable amount of time and effort was devoted to the collection of 
information on the key identifying instrument, the length of the suicide exemption 
period, related laws and regulations, and industrial norms, through our own survey on 
the life insurance associations and/or companies in each OECD country. These data are 
unique to this study. One of the footnotes in Table 1 provides the list of contacts that we 
prepared for each country. Dummy variables that represent the length of the suicide 
exemption period were constructed as follows: exemp1 = 1 if the exemption period is one 
year, and 0 otherwise; exemp2 = 1 if the exemption period is two years, and 0 otherwise; 
exemp3 = 1 if the exemption period is three years, and 0 otherwise; and exemp4 = 1 if 
there is no payment for suicide-related deaths, and 0 otherwise.13 The United States, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom were excluded because the length of the 
exemption period differs across states in the United States, and the precise information 
                                                 
12 Unadjusted suicide rates assign equal weight to each suicide, while adjusted suicide rates assign 
different weights to the suicide rates of different age groups based on the world standardized age 
profile. This reduces the influence of the country-specific age structure on total population (aggregated) 
suicide rate.  
   
13 The number of observations for exemp1, exampt2, exemp3, and exemp4 are 101, 103, 28, and 5, 
respectively (with a total of 237). The number of observations for zero exemption period is 75 and is 
taken as the default variable for exemption period dummy variables.  Note that this is the case where 
life insurance benefits are paid for any kinds of death including suicide.     10
on the length of the suicide exemption period was not available in the cases of the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
With regard to socioeconomic variables, the economic variable—real GDP per 
capita—was obtained from the Penn World Table 6.2, and the growth rate was calculated 
based on the real GDP per capita. The unemployment rate was obtained from the 
OECD health data. As a proxy for income inequality, Gini coefficients based on 
different definitions were acquired from the United Nations University’s World Income 
Inequality Database (WIID), and the average of the available Gini coefficients for each 
country was used as a single index. The birth rate, measured by the ratio of live births to 
the total population, was taken from the WHO Mortality Database. The divorce rate, 
measured by the ratio of the number of divorces to the total population, was obtained 
from the United Nations Common Database.  
The female labor force participation rate, measured as a percentage of female 
population ages 15-64 was acquired from the World Development Indicators of the 
World Bank. Finally, with respect to alcohol consumption, the sales data of pure alcohol, 
in liters, per individual over 15 years of age were taken from the OECD Health Data. 
Table 2 lists the definitions of socioeconomic variables and their sources. For a more 
detail explanation of the socioeconomic variables, please refer to Chen, Choi, and 
Sawada (2007a). 
 
III. Results of the Empirical Analysis 
 
As discussed in Section I, since we imposed two refinements in order to deal with 
the endogeneity problem, we conducted the estimations in the following order: first, 
Equation (1) was estimated without considering the omitted variables and the 
simultaneity problems (the baseline specification); second, only the simultaneity problem   11
in Equation (1) was addressed by using the IV technique through Equation (2) (the IV 
specification); third, only the omitted variable problem in Equation (1) was addressed by 
including time- and country-specific fixed effects as well as country-specific time trend 
(the FE specification); finally, we estimated Equation (3), where both the omitted 
variable problem and the simultaneity problem were accounted for (the FE-IV 
specification). In the following discussion, the nonparametric estimation results are 
presented in Figures 1(a)–(d), and the parametric estimation results are provided in Table 
3. Since the main focus is on the relationship between the suicide rate and life insurance 
density, we commence our discussion with the nonparametric estimation results. 
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) present the nonparametric estimation results of the baseline 
and IV specifications, respectively. These two figures are quite similar, and this implies 
that either there is no endogenous problem or the IV method fails to appropriately 
address the endogeneity problem. Indeed, the estimate of the coefficient of η in Table 3 
is not significant. Meanwhile, a slightly U-shaped relationship between suicide rate and 
life insurance density is revealed. Although the positive part of the U-shaped relationship 
is consistent with the existence of adverse selection and moral hazard in life insurance 
markets, it may be the result of not considering the fixed effects (omitted variables bias). 
Figures 1(c) and 1(d) present the nonparametric estimation results of the FE and 
the FE-IV specifications, respectively. Taking into account the fixed effects, the results in 
these two figures are very different from the previous results. Figures 1(c) and 1(d) 
present a positive relationship between suicide rate and life insurance density, except in 
the right-end tails where the life insurance density is high. This positive relationship is 
consistent with the existence of adverse selection and moral hazard in life insurance 
markets. A steeper slope in Figure 1(c) suggests a more substantial adverse selection and 
moral hazard. However, the estimate of the coefficient of η in the fourth column of 
Table 3 is significantly positive. This implies that the FE specification overestimates the   12
nonparametric part without taking into account the simultaneity pertaining to life 
insurance density and suicide. Since the results presented in Figure 1(d) and the fourth 
column of Table 3 take into account both refinements, we believe them to be the most 
convincing. 
In addition, a negative relationship between suicide rate and life insurance density 
is shown in the right-end tails of Figures 1(c) and 1(d). This may be considered to be 
inconsistent with asymmetric information theories when life insurance density is 
sufficiently high. One plausible interpretation is the existence of some other relevant 
unobservable variables that the estimation equations failed to account for. One such 
example is wealth. On an average, wealthier individuals are likely to purchase more life 
insurance (life insurance is a normal good); nevertheless, the proportion of coverage for 
loss in the event of death is likely to decrease with an increase in wealth.14 This implies 
that death benefits are less valuable for wealthier people. Hence, the financial incentives 
for suicides from insurance payments are weaker or minimum and hence lead to a 
negative relationship, as shown in the figures. However, to the best of our knowledge, 
there have been no asymmetric information studies exploring this potential “wealth 
effect.” 
As stated above, Equation (2)—a first-stage estimation of regressing the log life 
insurance density on the exemption period—is used in the IV and FE-IV specifications 
in order to address the simultaneity problem. In fact, since a short exemption period may 
induce self-selection of riskier types into life insurance contracts, the estimation result of 
Equation (2) can provide additional information on the existence of adverse selection. 
Table 4 shows the result of the first-stage estimation. We found that both exemp3 and 
exemp4 are significantly negative with regard to the level of life insurance density; this 
                                                 
14 Enz (2000) provides evidence suggesting that life insurance is a normal good for high levels of 
income.   13
suggests that a longer exemption period or no life insurance payment in cases of suicides 
is associated with a decrease in the purchase of life insurance policies. In other words, a 
longer exemption period may deter riskier types from purchasing life insurance contracts. 
With respect to the parametric part, a consistent finding is that the real GDP per 
capita is significantly negative. The female labor force participation rate is significant (at 
the 10% level) in the baseline specification; in addition, the fertility, divorce, and alcohol 
consumption rates are significant in the baseline and IV specifications. However, all 
these variables become insignificant after controlling for the fixed effects. The coefficient 
of the Gini index suggests a significantly negative relationship between suicide rate and 
inequality. This puzzling finding may result from the omitted variables bias. Indeed, the 
coefficient becomes significantly positive after controlling for the fixed effects. With 
respect to the FE-IV specification, the signs of most socioeconomic variables are 
consistent with the results presented in Chen, Choi, and Sawada (2007a) and other 
empirical studies on suicide. 
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, we investigate the nexus between life insurance and suicide using 
OECD cross-country data from 1980 to 2002. By using semiparametric IV regressions 
with fixed effects, this study finds a positive relationship between suicide rate and life 
insurance for a majority of observations. This suggests the presence of adverse selection 
and moral hazard in life insurance markets. Exceptions are the cases of high levels of life 
insurance density that may be explained by the wealth effect. This result challenges the 
current conception in the literature that problems associated with asymmetric 
information are less likely to occur in life insurance markets. The novelty of our analysis 
lies in the use of data on cross-country variations in the length of suicide exemption   14
periods as the main identifying instrumental variables for life insurance density. In 
further studies, the issues of adverse selection and moral hazard should be investigated 
by using individual-level data. 
Through this study, we would like to emphasize the importance of studying 
suicides by employing a somewhat “rational” approach. If people are willing to recognize 
that some suicides are rational, studies would be conducted to ascertain the different 
incentives behind suicides. By this way, we believe that suicide prevention can gather 
sufficient resources as the seriousness of the current situation warrants, and thereby 
effective measures of suicide prevention can be developed and implemented. 
Nevertheless, there is an important caveat to this study, particularly when deriving policy 
implications: not all suicides are driven by financial incentives. To stop paying suicide 
related death payments may eliminate the adverse selection and moral hazard problems 
as discussed in this paper, but it also questions the very basic function of life insurance—
to protect the beneficiaries against the sudden economic loss associated with the death of 
their love ones. These issues should be investigated carefully in the future studies. 
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Table 1. The Length of Exemption Periods in OECD Countries 
  1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  Law 
Australia  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  0 
Austria  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3  1 
Belgium  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Canada  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  1 
Czech  Republic  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  0 
Denmark  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Finland  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
France  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  1 
Germany  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3  1 
Greece  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞  ∞  2 2 2 2  1 
Hungary  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  1 
Iceland  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Ireland  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  NA 
Italy  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  0 
Japan  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2  1 
Korea  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  1 
Luxembourg  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Mexico  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  1 
Netherlands  NA  1 
New  Zealand  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Norway  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Poland  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  1 
Portugal  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  0 
Slovak  Republic  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  0 
Spain  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  0 
Sweden  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Switzerland  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3  1 
Turkey  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3  1 
United  Kingdom 1~2 1~2 1~2 1~2 1~2 1~2 1~2 1~2 1~2 1~2 1~2 1~2 1~2 1~2 1~2 1~2 1~2 1~2 1~2 1~2 1~2  0 
United States  Different by states 
Data sources: The authors’ survey of life insurance associations in each OECD country. Australia: Accident Research Center: Monash University; Austria: UNIQA Versicherungen AG; Belgium: Vanbreda Insurance Policy 
(http://www.aiic.net.ViewPage.cfm/article1593); Canada: Judgements of the supreme court of Canada; Czech Republic: Insurance Contact Act: Act No. 37/2004; Denmark: The Danish Insurance Association; Finland: Veritas Life 
Insurance Company Ltd; France: Insurance code (www.legifrance.gouv.fr); Germany: AXA Konzern AG; Greece: Association of Insurance Companies; Hungary: Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority; Iceland: Act on Insurance 
Contracts, No 30/2004; Ireland: Eagle Star; Italy: Assicurazioni Generali; Japan: Life Insurance Association of Japan; Korea: Korea Life Insurance Association, Luxembourg: Association des Compagnies d'Assurances; Mexico: Asociacion 
Mexicana de Instituciones de Seguros; Netherlands: Dutch Association of Insurers; New Zealand: Insurance Council of New Zealand Inc.; Norway: Norwegian Financial Services Association; Poland: Polish Chamber of Insurance; 
Portugal: Portuguese Insurers Association; Slovak: Republic Slovenská asociácia poisťovní; Spain: Association of Spanish Insurers; Sweden: Svenska Försäkringsföreningen; Switzerland: Swiss Insurance Association; Turkey: Association of 
the Insurance and Reinsurance Companies of Turkey; United Kingdom: Association of British Insurers; and United States: different across states. 
Notes: 
1. In the United States, most states(33) have a two-year suicide exemption period: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Two of the states—
Colorado and North Dakota—specify a one-year provision. In the following fourteen states and the District of Columbia, the length of the suicide exemption period exclusion is not addressed: Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Finally, Missouri has a law that invalidates the suicide clause. 
2. With the exception of the United States, among the OECD countries, there are laws governing the length of the suicide exemption period (in 20 countries; law = 1). The length of the suicide exemption period in the other nine 
countries were determined by industrial norms (law = 0). 
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Table 2. Variables and Data Sources 
 
Variable Definition  Source(s) 
Suicide rate  Rate per 100,000 people 









Life insurance density  Life insurance premium/population  Swiss Re Sigma database 
Per capita GDP  Real GDP 
Per capita GDP growth rate  Real GDP growth rate 
           
 




Unemployment rate  % of total labor force 
Alcohol consumption  liters per person aged 15 and above 
OECD Health Data 2005 
Additional source for alcohol consumption (only for Japanese data):  
National Tax Agency, Japan                
                                                                        
Divorce rate  % of total population  United Nations Common Database, 2007  
 
Gini coefficient  Average of Gini indices  
from different definitions 
World Income Inequality Database, V 2.0b, May 2007 
 
Female labor force participation  % of female population ages 15-64  World Development Indicators, 2006  
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Table 3. Summary Results of the Parametric Part 
Model specification  Baseline   IV    FE    FE-IV   
         Controlled for fixed effects  No    No    Yes    Yes   
          Instrumental variable estimation  No    Yes    No    Yes   
Variables  Estimate   Estimate   Estimate    Estimate  
Per capita GDP   –0.299
***  –0.302
***  –0.466 
***  –0.433
*** 
  (0.052)  (0.053)  (0.1)    (0.098) 
Per capita GDP growth rate  0.493  0.649  –0.09    –0.143 
  (0.868)   (0.881)  (0.252)    (0.249) 
Unemployment rate   –0.07  0.093  –0.003    –0.071 
  (0.62)  (0.636)  (0.471)    (0.475) 
Female labor force participation   0.018
*  0.014  –0.021    –0.019 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.017)    (0.016) 
Birth rate   0.371
***  0.386
***  –0.054    –0.065 
  (0.129)  (0.13)  (0.086)    (0.085) 
Divorce rate   0.293
***  0.305
***  0.032    0.036 
  (0.046)  (0.047)  (0.033)    (0.033) 
Alcohol consumption   0.043
***  0.044
***  –0.003    0.001 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.016)    (0.016) 
Gini coefficient   –0.031
***  –0.031
***  0.004 
**  0.005
** 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.002)    (0.002) 
Eta  --  -0.01  --    0.082
* 
 - -   (0.143)  --    (0.043) 
Number of observations  259    256    259    256   
R-squared 0.589    0.594    0.987    0.987   
 
Significance test statistics for the 








[p-value]  [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]    [0.000]  
Notes: 
1. The estimation is done by using the nonparametric part for life insurance density country-fixed effect, time-fixed 
effect, and country-specific linear time trend, which are not shown in the table. 
2. Robust standard errors provided in parentheses. 
3. “*” significant at 10%; “**” significant at 5%; “***” significant at 1%.   20
Table 4. Life Insurance Density Equation Regression Results  
(First-Stage Instrumental Variable Regression) 
 Coefficient  Std. Err. 
exemp1 0.0164  (0.0274) 
exemp2 –0.0343  (0.0230) 
exemp3 –0.0527*  (0.0311) 
exemp4 –0.0945*  (0.0492) 
Lag life insurance density  0.9637***  (0.0117) 
Per capita GDP  –0.0083  (0.0237) 
Per capita GDP growth rate   0.9567*  (0.5679) 
Unemployment rate  –0.3363*  (0.1744) 
Female labor force participation  0.0054*  (0.0032) 
Birth rate  –0.0959**  (0.0413) 
Divorce rate  –0.0288**  (0.0134) 
Alcohol consumption  0.0031  (0.0030) 
Gini coefficient  0.0007  (0.0018) 
Cons 0.2521  (0.1786) 
Overall R-squared  0.9852 
Wald statistics for zero coefficients  47884.59 
[p-value] [0.0000] 
Number of observations  270 
Number of countries  26 
 
Notes: 
1. The estimation is done by using random effects; robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
2. “*” significant at 10%; “**” significant at 5%; “***” significant at 1%.   21
Figure 1. Nonparametric Plots of the Relationship between Suicide Rate 
and Life Insurance Density 
 
        Figure 1(a)             Figure 1(b) 
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        Figure 1(c)              Figure 1(d) 
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